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ABSTRACT
Advanced driver assistance systems (ADASs) were devel-
oped to reduce the number of car accidents by issuing driver
alert or controlling the vehicle. In this paper, we tested the
robustness of Mobileye, a popular external ADAS. We injected
spoofed traffic signs into Mobileye to assess the influence of
environmental changes (e.g., changes in color, shape, projection
speed, diameter and ambient light) on the outcome of an attack.
To conduct this experiment in a realistic scenario, we used a
drone to carry a portable projector which projected the spoofed
traffic sign on a driving car. Our experiments show that it is
possible to fool Mobileye so that it interprets the drone carried
spoofed traffic sign as a real traffic sign.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced driver assistance systems (ADASs) [1] are elec-
tronic systems that aid automobile drivers while they are
driving. Such systems aim to help drivers by: 1) issuing alerts
(e.g., collision avoidance and lane departure alerts) regarding
potential threats and 2) recognizing upcoming traffic signs.
In order to support the abovementioned functionalities, These
systems use input obtained from multiple sensors including:
video camera, LiDAR and radar. ADASs have already become
an integral part of the current car generation, and they will
provide automated functionalities for the next generation of
cars (autonomous vehicles).
Recently, these systems have attracted increase attention
within academia, and the academic community has begun
to investigate the systems robustness to various attacks. Re-
cent studies [2], [3], [4], [5] showed that ADAS alerts and
notifications can be spoofed by applying adversarial machine
learning techniques to traffic signs, allowing attackers to control
the output of the ADAS for their benefit. Application of the
methods suggested in these studies exposes drivers that respond
to ADAS alerts and notifications and other nearby drivers
and pedestrians to variety of risks that can cause accidents.
However, the suggested attacks are complicated and require
deep understanding of the ADAS used in order to manipulate
it. In addition, the nature of the attacks necessitated that the
attacker be located near the traffic sign in order to perform
the attack. Because of this, the attacks suggested in the recent
studies are impractical in real life scenarios. We wonder whether
a complicated attack is really needed to manipulate an ADAS?
In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of Mobileye the
most popular off-the-shelf ADAS on the market today. It
currently provides features like lane departure warnings and
traffic sign recognition based on video camera processing.
We show that attackers can use a projector in order to inject
traffic signs into Mobileye, effectively remote controlling
a targeted car according to their wishes. We performed
various experiments and assessed the influence of color, shape,
projection speed, diameter, and ambient light on the outcome of
the attack by mounting a projector onto a drone and injecting
traffic signs into the ADAS of a real driving car.
We make the following contributions: First, unlike other
studies in this area that trained a classifier and found vulnera-
bilities to attack the ADAS, we evaluated the practicality of our
attack against Mobileye, a real off-the-shelf ADAS. Second,
our vector attack doesn’t require the attacker to be in the attack
location; we present a remote attack that can be executed by a
drone.
II. BACKGROUND
Advanced driver assistance systems [1] were developed to
automate, adapt and enhance vehicle systems for safety and
improved driving. Most road accidents occur due to human
error, and ADASs use input from sensors like video cameras
to reduce human error by issuing driver alerts or controlling
the vehicle. Such systems have become common in modern
cars, with automobile manufacturers integrating these systems
in their cars [6], [7].
There are six levels of automation when it comes to ADASs
[8], the highest level (5) is fully automated where the ADAS
controls all aspects of the car, and the lowest level (0) where
the driver controls all aspects of the car, and can only receive
input (in the form of alerts) from the ADAS.
Mobileye is an external ADAS that does not provide full
automation (Level 5) but rather provides function-specific
vehicle automation (Level 0). The Mobileye 630 PRO contains
two main components, as can be seen in Figure 1. The first is
a camera, which is installed on the windshield, under the rear
view mirror, and the second is a small display which is placed
in front of the driver and provides visual and audible alerts
about the surroundings as needed. Mobileye has the following
features:
1) Lane departure warning: this is activated when a lane
deviation occurs without proper signal notification by the
driver; this feature is activated when the driving speed
is over 55 kilometers per hour.
2) Pedestrian collision warning: this feature notifies the
driver of an imminent collision with a pedestrian or
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2Fig. 1. Mobileye 630 PRO components
cyclist; this feature can only be used during daylight and
is activated when the driving speed is under 50 km/h
(this feature can be configured to be up to 70 km/h).
3) Forward collision warning: This feature notifies the
driver about rear-end collisions with any type of vehicle.
4) Headway monitoring and warning: This feature notifies
the driver when there is an unsafe distance between the
driver’s vehicle and the vehicle ahead of it, this feature
is activated when the driving speed is over 30 km/h.
5) Intelligent high beam control: This turns the high beams
on and off depending on the light and relative distance
from other vehicles, a feature which is only used at night.
6) Recognizing upcoming traffic signs: Recognizing and
reading traffic signs (speed limit, entering a highway,
etc.).
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe related work on attacks against
ADASs and provide an overview of adversarial attacks. The
computer vision classifier is an integral ADAS component
which is used to detect traffic signs from a video stream in an
ADAS. Many of these classifiers are trained using deep learning
techniques. Several studies created adversarial instances to trick
such deep learning classifiers and showed that this type of
classifier is vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Petrakieva et al. [2]
demonstrated how perturbations that are often too small to be
perceptible to humans can fool deep learning models. Sitawarin
et al. [9] showed that they could embed two traffic signs in one
traffic sign with a dedicated array of lens that causes a different
traffic sign to appear depending on the angle of view. Eykholt
et al. [10] and Lu et al. [3] showed that physical artifacts (e.g.,
stickers, graffiti) misled computer vision classifiers. In the
abovementioned studies, the researchers only trained dedicated
models by themselves and identified instances that could exploit
them using white-box techniques. Furthermore, the researchers
did not show the effectiveness of the attack against an off-the-
shelf ADAS. In contrast, we demonstrate our attack against
the Mobileye system and mislead it so it recognizes spoofed
traffic signs using black-box techniques.
Attacks against ADAS are not, however, limited to mislead-
ing the classifier using an adversarial traffic sign. Petit et al.
[4] presented two attack vectors against car’s sensors such
as LiDAR and cameras. They were able to show that: 1) a
laser directed at the camera can destroy the optical sensor
permanently, and 2) LiDAR’s output can be spoofed using
infrared light. Yan et al. [11] demonstrated various spoofing
attacks against a camera, ultrasonic sensor, and radar that can
cause Tesla’s Model S to misperceive the distance of nearby
obstacles. However, it is not possible to perform the suggested
attacks [4], [11] on a driving car due to the complexity of the
attacks because: 1) they require deploying devices at specific
ranges from the attacked car, and 2) the attacker must connect
the hardware directly to a driving autonomous car which
can be a major challenge due to the driving speed. A recent
study [5] misdirected an autopiloted vehicle, taking it in the
wrong direction. The authors placed interference patches (small
stickers) on the ground at two way route, causing the vehicle
to turn in to the opposite lane. In this case, the attacker must
physically put the stickers on the road; in contrast, our attack
vector doesn’t require the attacker to be on site, since the drone
can be deployed remotely.
Other famous attacks against cars that are not related to our
work are [12], [13], which were based on compromising the
firmware of the car or an internal device. Our attack model is
much lighter than these attacks, since it does not require us to
hack to those systems.
IV. THREAT MODEL
We consider an attacker as any malicious entity with the aim
of attacking a driving car. The attacker can inject spoofed traffic
signs into Mobileye using a portable projector mounted on a
drone. The attacker’s goals can be to: 1) harm or manipulate
the car of a specific victim, or 2) cause environmental chaos
(e.g., harm multiple cars in a specific region such as a city,
neighborhood, highway, etc.).
In this paper, we present a means of executing this threat
model, using a drone equipped with a portable projector as
our injection method. Mobileye (Figure 1) is the sensor we
are going to mislead by projecting a traffic sign that does not
fit the surroundings and risks the driver/car that follows the
injected traffic sign.
In our study we show focus on the traffic signs recognition.
V. MOBILEYE ANALYSIS
In order to execute our suggested threat model (described in
Section IV), we focus on Mobileye’s traffic sign recognition
features. In the following subsections, we learn the effect of
environmental factors (ambient light, distance) on the result of
the attack. In addition, we test the robustness of the Mobileye
for classifying traffic signs that do not exist.
A. Experimental Setup
In this subsection, we describe the setup for the experiments
performed. For convenience we used a white projector screen,
in order as screen for the projected traffic sign. A portable
projector was used to provide the sign’s content. The injection
method, as described in Section 4, is comprised of the projector
and screen. The portable projector was placed on a tripod about
2.5 meters from the screen and projected a traffic sign onto the
3Fig. 2. Experimental setup: the projected sign is boxed in red, and the attacked
vehicle is boxed in yellow
center of the screen; while the sign was projected in this way
we drove the car (a Renault Captur equipped with Mobileye
630 PRO) in a straight line at a speed of approximately 25
km/h. Figure 2 presents an illustration of our experimental
setup.
B. Influence of the Projected Sign’s Diameter
Fig. 3. Influence of the sign’s diameter
1) Experimental Setup: In this case, we investigate whether
the size of the projected sign influences the distance from which
the Mobileye 630 PRO’s sensor can detect the projected sign.
We repeated the experiment five times, projecting a different
sized sign each time, and calculated the average detection
distance.
2) Results: Figure 3 presents the results of this experiment.
As can be seen, if the sign is too small (less than 16 cm in
diameter) the Mobileye 630 Pro sensor didn’t detect it at all.
The red dots in the graph symbolize the average distance at
which we managed to mislead the sensor, and the grey area
shows the range of the entire samples set.
3) Conclusion: The diameter range is wide and provides a
lot of room for error when projecting a traffic sign. Based on
our measurements, the distance can range from approximately
5-16 meters.
C. Influence of the Color of the Projected Sign
1) Experimental Setup: Here we assess whether the Mobil-
eye 630 PRO sensor is sensitive to the color of the sign. We
Fig. 4. (a) examples of different colored traffic signs, (b) an example of a
different traffic sign shape, (c) an example of an incorrect or unrecognized
speed limit value
tried various colors as seen in (Figure 4a). First we projected
the sign with its true colors, and then we verified that the
Mobileye 630 PRO sensor managed to recognize the sign.
Next, we projected the same sign but this time with a color
scheme which is different from the real one.
2) Results: We could see, quite quickly, that Mobileye is
not sensitive to color, since all of the signs tested managed to
mislead the sensor (even the black and white speed limit sign
seen in, Figure 4a).
3) Conclusion: Based on these results we conclude that the
Mobileye 630 PRO sensor only considers the shape of a sign
when trying to classify the sign’s content.
D. Influence of the Projected Sign’s Shape
1) Experimental Setup: In this case, we evaluate whether
the Mobileye 630 PRO sensor can detect signs which do not
take the form of their original shape. For this experiment we
simply took a speed limit sign and modified its shape (as seen
in Figure 4b). This experiment was binary, i.e., we only wanted
to know if the sign can be detected or not.
2) Results: We utilized a total of seven different shapes (a
triangle, rectangle, pentagon, and hexagon, as well as three
other more unusual shapes - a star, arrow, and random polygon).
The Mobileye 630 PRO’s sensor was unable to detect any of
these shapes.
3) Conclusion: We can conclude the Mobileye system
considers just the shape of the sign and isn’t fooled by unknown
shapes.
E. Influence of Ambient Light
1) Experimental Setup: In this case, we tested the effect of
ambient light, utilizing 20 samples (drives) from every hour
of the day to check our injection success rate.
2) Results: Figure 5 presents the results of this experiment;
success is considered a sample (drive) in which Mobileye
recognized the projected sign.
3) Conclusion: Based on our analysis of these results we
can conclude that is possible to inject a spoofed traffic sign
at all hours of the day, but performance is best later in the
day (in the evening and at night). One thing that should be
considered with regard to ambient light is the equipment used,
4Fig. 5. Influence of Ambient Light
since the opacity of the projected sign depends on the ambient
light as well as the projector used (a better success rate may
be achieved with a better projector).
F. Influence of the Speed of the Projection Time
1) Experimental Setup: Here we assessed the speed of the
projection time that is needed to fool the system. We conducted
a few experiments that measured the amount of time required
for injection.
2) Results: We discovered that a projection speed of 100
ms is sufficient for fooling the system. We were unable to fool
the system with faster projection speeds probably due to the
frame per second rate of the optical sensor of the Mobileye.
3) Conclusion: The fast projection speed causes the attack
vector on the target to be very easy to inject and doesn’t require
staying for to long.
G. Influence of the Number on the Projected Sign
1) Experimental Setup: In this case, we investigate whether
the Mobileye 630 PRO sensor can also detect speed limit signs
with speed values that are not used in the real world (e.g.
Figure 4.c).
2) Results: Table 1 presents the results of this experiment.
3) Conclusion: Based on these results, we can conclude
that incorrect speed limit signs are effective at misleading the
system. The system do not ignore them and classify them as
other similar traffic signs.
VI. ATTACKING A CAR WHILE DRIVING
In this section, we demonstrate how attackers can apply the
attack remotely using drone.
1) Experimental setup: We mounted a portable projector on
a drone (DJI Matrice 600) (Figure 6a). In this experimental
setup our car (a Renault Captur equipped with Mobileye 630
PRO) was driven in an urban environment as the attacker
operated a drone, positioning the drone so the spoofed speed
limit sign can be injected into the Mobileye sensor. The routes
can be seen in Figure: 6b. At the starred location on the map,
the attacker projected the incorrect speed limit sign (seen in
Figure 6c), managing to mislead the Mobileye sensor which
recognized the sign as a 90 km/h speed limit sign (see Figure
7). The implemented attack vector can be seen in an uploaded
video of the attack 1.
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PP-qTdRugEI&feature=youtu.be
TABLE I
DETECTION OF INCORRECT SPEED LIMIT SIGNS,(LEFT: SPEED LIMIT ON
THE PROJECTED SIGN. RIGHT: THE DETECTED SPEED LIMIT, AS SHOWN ON
THE MOBILEYE DISPLAY, X MEANS NO DETECTION)
Projected Speed limit Detected Speed limit
0 X
1 X
2 X
3 X
4 X
5 5
6 X
7 X
8 X
9 X
27 X
43 X
69 60
71 70
88 80
150 X
160 X
170 X
180 110
190 110
200 X
2) Results: We managed to fool Mobileye so it classified
the speed limit as 90 km/h when the speed limit for a city
road is only 30 km/h.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we discuss countermeasure methods that can
be used to prevent computer vision classifiers used by ADASs
from being misled by an attacker. The suggested measures
are passive which means that they 1) don’t require any source
of power for transmitters, and (2) prevent all kinds of visual
spoofing attacks, including projected traffic signs and image
perturbations that mislead the system to consider (classify) a
sign as a real sign.
We found that inserting a QR code into traffic signs is the
most effective way of preventing the Mobileye sensor from
being misled by a spoofed traffic sign; more specifically, in
this countermeasure method, the QR code contains a signed
message to the approaching car, informing the car of the traffic
sign ahead, and its type, coordinates, and digital signature for
authentication during the recognition process. In this way: 1)
the accurate location of the sign and the sign type can be
authenticated, and 2) the digital signature is used to verify
that the traffic sign is not fake. This solution can, however,
be vulnerable to GPS spoofing and can cause the Mobileye
system to recognize the current sign as another sign located
elsewhere due to the change of coordinates (an example of a
sign and message can be seen in Figure 8).
3D traffic signs can also be used to eliminate the threat of
projected traffic signs. Since our attack model (2D projection)
is aimed at the video camera which can’t distinguish between
2D and 3D signs (see Subsection V-A), the obvious way to
counter the attack is to use sensors that can detect 3D objects
(such as LiDAR); however, an attacker could make 3D sign
5Fig. 6. Attacking a car while driving (a) the drone with the projector used in our experiments, (b) visualization of the threat model implementation, (c) the
moment of the attack (the projected sign is boxed in blue, the attacker’s drone is boxed in purple, and the victim’s car is boxed in red).
Fig. 7. Mobileye display before and during the attack.
Fig. 8. Traffic sign authentication countermeasure. (a) example of the traffic
sign with the QR code, (b) example of the QR code included in the message
sent to the car, (c) the message extracted from the QR code (including the
signature).
that contains the content desired by the attacker and physically
place it everywhere.
Our last countermeasure suggestion involves the use of a
social navigation application (such as Waze) that can map all
of the traffic signs and create a traffic sign database; in this
way the ADAS can verify the traffic signs using the database.
This solution requires Internet connectivity for updating the
traffic signs using information sent from other drivers, making
it vulnerable to cyber-attacks and GPS spoofing.
Our suggestions can be implemented in a short period of
time, whereas the next generation of traffic signs will take
TABLE II
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR EACH COUNTERMEASURE
METHOD
Method Advantages Disadvantages
Image authentication Allow verification oftraffic signs
Vulnerable to GPS
spoofing
3D signs Mitigate projection at-tack
Vulnerable to replay at-
tacks that require phys-
ical approach
Social navigation ap-
plication(Waze)
Verify against updat-
able database
Require Internet con-
nectivity and vulnera-
ble to GPS spoofing
much longer. Next generation "car-to-car communication"
will include transmitters in traffic lights and signs, which
will transmit signals to the car, effectively providing the car
with instructions; the car will then operate in accordance
with the instructions. Adaptation of the overall transportation
environment in light of these changes will take some time;
until then the countermeasures presented may be helpful.
VIII. RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE
We are currently in the middle of the process of responsible
disclosure. We sent our findings to Mobileye and Tesla and
we are waiting for their response.
IX. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss our research which provides
new insights into the risks associated with both autonomous
and nonautonomous vehicles. In this paper, we showed how
easy is to maliciously fool ADASs, such as Mobileye. These
systems provide the data need for autonomous driving, and
our sign spoofing attack presents a major threat to autonomous
vehicles which rely on these systems. In addition, our discussion
of related work revealed many vulnerabilities, causing us to
wonder whether AV development should continue without first
addressing the security issues mentioned. We know that in the
future new communication methods (vehicle-to-vehicle/V2V
and vehicle-to-infrastructure/V2I communications) to improve
driving and safety will be implemented. V2V communication
will be used for exchanging data between vehicles, including
information about the application of brakes, speed, location, live
threats from the road, etc., while V2I communication will be
used for exchanging data between vehicles and the environment
(e.g., recognition of traffic lights and traffic signs); in both cases,
information exchange will take place via radio frequencies (Wi-
Fi). These next generation systems will not be vulnerable to
computer vision attacks like traffic sign spoofing and ADAS
manipulation, because projection or perturbations of the signs
won’t be relevant - data will flow over radio frequencies -
however the systems of the future will be vulnerable to new
attack vectors (e.g., GPS spoofing, hacking Wi-Fi transmitters
and mimicking transmitters, and jamming). It is our hope that
our research will contribute to improved driving and safety
now and in the future.
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